Reform that! Greece’s failing reform technology: beyond ‘vested interests’ and ‘political exchange’ by Monastiriotis, Vassilis & Antoniades, Andreas
 All views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not  
necessarily represent the views of the Hellenic Observatory or the LSE 
 
© Vassilis Monastiriotis and Andreas Antoniades 
 
 
 
 
Reform that! Greece’s failing reform 
technology: beyond ‘vested interests’ and 
‘political exchange’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vassilis Monastiriotis and  
Andreas Antoniades 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GreeSE Paper No 28 
 
Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe 
 
 
 
October 2009 
 
  
 
_
 
Table of Contents 
 
ABSTRACT _______________________________________________________ iii 
1. Introduction _______________________________________________________1 
2. Reform failure in Greece: waves of explanations__________________________4 
3. From context to content: knowledge in the policy process___________________8 
4. Greek reform pathologies:  non-evidence based policy, and design without 
knowledge__________________________________________________________12 
5. Concluding remarks: what explains the deficient engagement? _____________23 
References _________________________________________________________29 
 
 
                                                 
Acknowledgements 
We wish to express our gratitude to Kevin Featherstone for providing an inspiration 
and guidance at the early stages of this research. Discussions with various other 
colleagues, including Nikos Christodoulakis, Kostas Lavdas, Stella Ladi and Eleni 
Xiarchogiannopoulou also helped us shape the views that are developed in this paper. 
The paper was originally presented at the International Conference on “The Challenge 
of Reform in Greece, 1974-2009: Assessment and Prospects” organised by the 
Hellenic Studies Programme of Yale University (May 2009). The useful comments 
from George Pagoulatos, Platon Tinios, Dimitris Papadimitriou, Dimitris Sotiropoulos 
and other conference participants are gratefully acknowledged. A slightly modified 
version of the paper is forthcoming as a chapter in an edited volume, under the 
conference title, edited by Stathis Kalyvas, George Pagoulatos and Haris Tsoukas 
(Hurst & Co / Columbia University Press). We are grateful to the editors and the 
publisher for allowing the prepublication of the paper in this series. 
 
  
 
Reform that! Greece’s failing reform technology:  
beyond ‘vested interests’ and ‘political exchange’ 
 
Vassilis Monastiriotis# and Andreas Antoniades* 
 
ABSTRACT 
Despite significant progress in its path towards Europeanisation 
over the last two decades, Greece’s reform record remains highly 
problematic. Persistent reform failures and a continuum of half-way 
reforms have characterised much of the country’s recent history. In 
this paper we depart form dominant explanations in the literature 
that focus predominantly on the political and social context (lack of 
political will, fragmentation of organised interests, extent of rent-
seeking, etc) and instead focus on the processes shaping the content 
of reform proposals. We identify an inherent deficiency in the 
country’s reform technology, linked to a deficient engagement of 
policy-making with expert knowledge (encompassing all aspects of 
knowledge production, processing and utilisation), which results in 
continuous policy-learning failures and, ultimately, inefficient 
reforms. Our analysis calls for a re-direction of emphasis from the 
study of how actors contest reforms to the pathologies that lead to 
the production of contestable reform proposals. 
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Reform that! Greece’s failing reform technology:  
beyond ‘vested interests’ and ‘political exchange’ 
 
 
1. Introduction 
It is widely recognised in the literature that Greece’s reform record is highly 
problematic, with failures encompassing all facets of the reform process: the 
conception and design of reforms; the processes of consultation (public 
dialogue) and concertation (social dialogue); the process of consensus-building; 
and the process of implementation and enforcement. A number of explanations 
have been offered in the literature. These range from explanations highlighting 
the lack of political will, the fragmentation of organised interests, the extent of 
rent-seeking and the absence of positive-sum exchanges between the interested 
parties (Ioannou, 2000; Featherstone et al, 2001; Pagoulatos, 2003; 
Sotiropoulos, 2004), to ones focusing more on socio-cultural and socio-political 
characteristics such as the history of clientelism, corruption and ‘inefficient 
bureaucracy’, and the low social capital (Lyberaki and Tsakalotos, 2002; 
Lavdas, 2005; Zambarloukou, 2006; Featherstone, 2008). Interestingly, the 
literature (and, with it, wider public debates) has paid much less attention in 
two other, in our view crucial, factors (for an exception see Featherstone et al, 
2001; Ladi 2005): the limited role of experts in informing policy-design and the 
poor content of many reform proposals.  
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Departing from more traditional explanations of Greece’s weak reform 
performance, in this paper we focus on the stage of conception and design of 
reforms, assigning an elevated significance to the role of research and expert 
knowledge for policy formation. We are driven to this choice by an observation 
that has been rather overlooked in the political science literature. Namely that 
reform proposals and policies often appear to be strictly inefficient (rather than 
contested and stagnated), either in the sense of not addressing the actual 
problems that they aim to resolve, or in the sense of addressing them in 
incomplete and fragmented ways (thus, again, not resolving them). This 
suggests an inherent deficiency to designing efficiency-enhancing, positive-sum 
reforms which, we argue, is largely unrelated to Greece’s lack of tradition in 
social dialogue and consensus-building or to its institutional capacity regarding 
the implementation of reforms – the two factors that dominate in the literature 
dealing with reform failures in Greece.  
We argue that what is at issue here is the deficient engagement between the 
policy-making and experts communities, which appears to be particularly 
pervasive in Greece. As evidence for this, we review numerous examples 
where the expert advice of scientific and policy bodies (both government-
sponsored and independent) has not been sought for or utilised and where the 
proposals of Expert Committees (Επιτροπές Σοφών), specifically set-up to 
advise government, have been abandoned or even discredited. Our review 
suggests two facets of the identified ‘engagement deficiency’: (a) politicians / 
policy-makers appear to have pre-set agendas and not to engage in a systematic 
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way with expert advice, independent or commissioned; while (b) even in cases 
where a consultation processes with experts takes place, the resulting policies 
are often in disagreement with the expert advice. We argue that these two 
facets constitute a specific pathology of Greece’s reform technology, which is 
located specifically and solely in the first stage of policy formulation, that of 
policy conception and design.  
Moreover, we argue that this ‘deficient engagement’ generates significant 
stumbling blocks in the policy-learning process (Hall, 1993) and thus in the 
design and implementation of reforms. Interestingly, in contrast to explanations 
based on ‘vested interests’, ‘political exchange’ and ‘institutional capacities’, 
this appears capable of explaining a paradox in Greek reform history, that of 
reform activism with little change in policies and outcomes.1  But, importantly, 
it also allows us to see how contestation and political exchange, by taking place 
after the formulation of policy proposals (‘adoption of new ideas’ – see Oliver 
and Pemberton, 2004), is actually pre-set to failure – despite or irrespective of 
the particular alignments of interests that may be present in any given 
conjuncture.  
Overall, we argue that our analysis makes a robust case for re-directing our 
emphasis from the identification of ‘vested interests’ and ‘reform resistance’ 
(i.e., actors that block reforms) to actually seeking to understand the specific 
                                                 
1
 There are in fact two facets to this. On the one hand, a paradox of continuing reform activism in the 
presence of continuing reform failures (persistence in the contestation between presumably conflicting 
interests); on the other, a paradox of continuing reform failures despite reform activism (failures in the 
adoption and institutionalisation of new ideas).  
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pathologies that lead to the production of inefficient reforms that do not allow 
concerned actors to accept them. We believe that this has the potential to make 
a significant contribution towards a paradigmatic shift in policy-making that 
can reform the reform technology of the country. 
 
2. Reform failure in Greece: waves of explanations 
The last decade has seen the development of a large and thoughtful literature 
that attempts to explain why reform efforts in various sectors of the Greek 
political and economic system have been unsuccessful2. The first wave of this 
literature was dominated by contributions that were focusing on ‘historico-
cultural’ and/or socio-political arrangements that have their origins in the 
foundation of the Greek state. Dominant factors in these explanations were the 
enduring clientelism and patronage relations that have dominated Greek 
political life, as well as the omnipresent and all-pervasive role of political 
parties and party mentality in all aspects of political life. Civil society and other 
organised interests that in other western societies have balanced the role of the 
state, in Greece have traditionally been subsumed by the state, which in turn 
was subsumed by political parties (seminal contributions here include works by 
Tsoukalas, 1993; Mouzelis, 1978; Diamandouros, 1994; Mavrogordatos, 
                                                 
2
 In this context, reforms are understood as ‘deliberate changes to the structures and processes of public 
sector organisations with the objective of getting them (in some sense) to perform better’ (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2000: 17). 
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1988)3. Thus Greece has never experienced an independent state administrative 
apparatus, along Weberian lines (see also Ferrera, 1996, 1998).    
Building on this literature, a second wave of literature focused on the ‘path-
dependence’ implications of the above socio-political and cultural 
characteristics in social change and reform efforts in contemporary Greece4.  
Calliope Spanou and Dimitris Sotiropoulos have focused on the defining 
characteristics of Greek public administration and their implications for Greek 
political life (indicatively, see Sotiropoulos, 1994; Spanou, 1996). Sotiropoulos 
(1993) developed the thesis of ‘a colossus with feet of clay’. Attempting to re-
evaluate the structure of interest intermediation in Greece, Kostas Lavdas 
(1997) and George Pagoulatos (2003) developed the concepts of ‘disjointed 
corporatism’ and ‘parentela pluralism’. Yet the defining aspect of this second 
wave of publications was an explicit concern with the phenomenon of 
Europeanisation, i.e. the impact that EU membership had on the Greek state 
and its structure, organisation, practices and policies (see Ioakimidis, 1996, 
2001; Tsoukalis, 1999, 2001; Featherstone, 1998, 1998a, 2005; Kazakos, 1999, 
2004; Mitsos and Mossialos, 2000: parts III and IV; Pagoulatos, 2001; and 
Allison and Nicolaidis, 1997). Therefore most of this literature focused on 
externally-driven reforms, i.e. how Greece responded to pressures and 
convergence policies ‘coming from’ the EU. Most scholars suggested that 
                                                 
3
 Concepts such as ‘state corporatism’ (Schmitter, 1977), ‘Napoleonic tradition’ (Peters, 2008), ‘state 
capitalism’ (Schmidt, 2002), ‘Latin model’, ‘Sultanic state’, have been used to capture aspects of these 
characteristics, which have been historically observed mostly in countries of ‘late development’ in the 
semi-periphery (Mouzelis, 1986). 
4
 The literature is too large to do any justice to it here. 
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although significant progress has been made, and although ‘Europeanisation’ 
has been clearly visible in some public sectors – e.g. foreign policy (see 
Tsardanidis and Stavridis, 2005; Ladi 2007) or employment policies 
(Sotiropoulos, 2004) – Greece has remained one of the least responsive and 
least effective member-states in implementing EU-initiated policies and 
strategies (see Featherstone, 2008; Spanou, 2008)5. To explain this reform 
pathology some authors looked back into the socio-political and cultural factors 
mentioned above, while others used new theoretical or conceptual tools in 
political science literature, pointing for instance to factors such as ‘trust’ and 
‘social capital’ (see for instance Paraskevopoulos, 2001; Featherstone, 2005; 
Tinios, 2005; Zambarloukou, 2006) or to ‘advocacy coalition networks’ (Ladi, 
2005). Thus explanations advanced here included the significant role of 
clientelism, the pervasive role of political parties in political life, corruption, 
the fragmented and particularistic structure of interest representation, the 
polarisation of the political system and the conflictual nature of political 
culture, the atrophy or weakness of civil society, the weak state apparatus and 
its incapacity to plan and implement policies and reforms, and to form winning 
pro-reform advocacy coalitions, the absence of social dialogue combined with a 
rather complete absence of ‘trust’ between social partners, the negative public 
attitudes towards reforms, the political cost related to reforms, or even the lack 
of political will (for detailed reviews of main explanations see Sotiropoulos, 
2004, Featherstone, 2005, 2008). 
                                                 
5
 To capture this malaise in reforms in Greece, different authors have used terms such as low ‘policy 
capacity’, low ‘reform capacity’ or referred to different ‘reform trajectories’ and ‘reform paths’. 
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Currently the focus of investigation seems to be on the issues of Greek ‘reform 
technology’ and ‘policy capacity’ (regardless or rather despite of 
Europeanisation and outside-in pressures). These analyses both sum-up 
previous findings and revive the discussion of what exactly is wrong with 
Greece’s reform technology and what (if anything) can be done to reform this 
reform technology! Reviewing Greek reform failures, Featherstone (2008: 27) 
concludes that due to the nature of Greek polity ‘[s]top-go, incremental policy 
reform[s]’ will continue to be the dominant model of reform in Greece (at least 
with regard to market liberalisation reforms). In this regard the ‘“system”, 
rather than personalities or parties,... ,[tell] the essential story of both voice and 
interest’ in Greek reform failures (ibid.: 30).  
Our argument in this paper is that although these conclusions certainly apply to 
many failed reform attempts in Greece, its generalisation as an analytical 
framework for understanding and analysing the pathology of Greek reform 
technology is problematic. On the one hand using the ‘institutional context’ to 
explain social change or continuity, important as it is for comprehending our 
social world, carries with it a problem inherent in comparative analysis. It 
underestimates agency and generates a rather deterministic perspective of the 
social universe in question. Thus change can only come from an ‘external 
shock’, but even then it is ‘path-dependent’.  
On the other hand and more importantly, however, we contend that the focus 
on socio-political, institutional and/or cultural factors has drawn our attention 
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away from the content of reform proposals themselves6. We claim that a 
significant number of reforms in Greece have failed not because of the 
institutional context, but simply because they were ill-thought, ill-prepared and 
poorly substantiated and designed. In these cases the problem was not to be 
found in the stages of reform communication, negotiation or implementation, 
but in the stage of their conception and design. This remains an institutional 
problem. But what is at issue here is not the structure of interest representation, 
the lack of social capital or the presence of clientelism in the abstract; but the 
way in which political power conceives, decides and designs reforms. The next 
section analyses the nature of this problem. 
 
3. From context to content: knowledge in the policy process 
If our thesis is correct and a significant part of Greece’s reform pathology is 
due to content rather than broader socio-political factors, then the key question 
is how reform actors arrive at and decide the reform content, i.e. what 
knowledge and resources they use in order to conceive, decide and design the 
reforms they deem necessary. 
The issue of when and how decision makers use knowledge and expertise to 
design reforms, and especially what knowledge they use, remains an open 
question in public administration and policy studies (see James and Jorgensen, 
2009). Speaking to this deficiency in the literature, James and Jorgensen (ibid.: 
                                                 
6
 For a similar argument see Weimer, 1998 and James and Jorgensen, 2009. 
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143) have called for a new approach to policy making analysis that would focus 
on the ‘utilisation of policy knowledge...as an independent variable in the 
policy process, a causal factor leading to more informed policy formulation and 
change with increased likelihood of success’.  
The debates that dominate the literature of policy analysis on this issue can be 
seen as taking place along two intersecting axes. In the first axis, on the one 
hand we have approaches that attempt to ‘describe and analyse networks where 
possessors of knowledge participate in and influence policy learning and policy 
change’ (Ladi, 2005: 281; see also). The three main approaches here are 
epistemic communities (Haas, 1992; for a critique see Antoniades, 2003), 
advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; for a 
critique see James and Jorgensen, 2009), and policy transfer networks (Evans 
and Davies, 1999), while thoughtful research has also been done on the role of 
think tanks (Stone, 1996; Stone and Denham, 2004) and transnational networks 
(Risse, 1994, 1995;   Evangelista, 1998). On the other end of this axis is what 
James and Jorgensen (2009) refer to as ‘utilisation literature’, that is a body of 
literature that ‘addresses the utilisation, or lack thereof, of applied policy 
research...[T]he primary focus of the utilisation literature has been to 
understand the conditions facilitating and inhibiting when and how decision 
makers use policy information (directly or indirectly)’. The aim of this 
literature is ‘not to understand the role of policy knowledge in fostering 
outcomes’ but to develop a theory that will enhance knowledge utilisation in 
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the future (ibid. 148; for a literature review on utilisation theory see ibid. 
especially pp. 147-149; KUPI, 2004).  
In the second axis the issue in question is the nature of (valid) knowledge itself. 
One end of this axis is dominated by a narrow positivistic approach to what is 
valid knowledge, while the other end is dominated by a post-positivistic 
approach to knowledge. At the positivistic end, the only valid knowledge is 
knowledge produced by ‘scientists’ – therefore, epistemic communities are the 
only source of valid knowledge. Here the focus has traditionally been mostly 
on modelling and quantitative approaches to scientific research and knowledge 
utilisation in policy process has been unidirectional and top-down. On the 
contrary, at the post-positivistic end, valid knowledge and expertise are not 
exclusive properties of a narrowly defined ‘scientific community’, but may 
come from practitioners, advocacy networks, or other stakeholders involved in 
the policy area or issue in question. Here the emphasis has traditionally been on 
qualitative methods of scientific research, while the main assumption is that for 
knowledge utilisation to be effective and successful learning should not only be 
top-down but bottom-up too (see Bell, 2004).  
It should be underlined that this controversy on the nature of valid knowledge 
is not a debate on whether systematic knowledge is important for policy 
process. This is taken for granted. The dispute has been about what forms of 
knowledge are or can be legitimate participants in the policy process. 
Furthermore it can be argued that the distance between the two ends of this 
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debate has been significantly reduced over the last years. Thus the need for 
both quantitative and qualitative methods and evidence as well as the need for 
both top-down and bottom-up knowledge and learning is now widely 
recognised.  
In some countries, this recognition of the importance of systematic knowledge 
for effective policy making has found its way into policy formulation. For 
instance, in the UK, evidence-based policy making (EBPM) is seen as an 
organic part of policy formulation. The Cabinet Office's Better Policy Making 
(2001) document identifies four key stages in this policy development process: 
(i) a review of existing research, (ii) commission of new research, (iii) 
consultation with experts or use of internal and external consultants, and (vi) 
consideration of a wide range of properly appraised and cost options. The 
definition of what counts as evidence in this EBPM is equally important. 7 In 
particular a ‘tripartite approach’ is suggested: 
Evidence for policy has three components. First is hard data (facts, 
trends, survey information) but the second component is the analytical 
reasoning that sets the hard data in context. Third, an evidence base 
comprises stakeholder opinion on an issue or set of issues. (DEFRA, 
official website, 11/09/09)  
                                                 
7
 Yet, the concept of EBPM itself has been criticised for being used without any substantiation or as a 
policy legitimisation instrument. See House of Commons, 2006: 45-62. 
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Yet, this approach does not constitute an unconditional delegation of policy 
design to ‘technocrats’. As DEFRA (ibid) acknowledges: 
Decisions are influenced by a wide variety of factors (including 
Ministers' values, experience and political judgement). This means that 
even in individual policy areas the evidence base must be both broad 
enough to develop a wide range of policy options, and detailed enough 
for those options to stand up to intense scrutiny. Thus an evidence-
based approach should clearly show the line of sight between horizon 
scanning, strategy, policy, and delivery. 
 
4. Greek reform pathologies:  non-evidence based policy, and design 
without knowledge 
In March 2009, amidst the global financial crisis and in response to calls for 
implementing ‘special measures’ in the labour market, the Minister for 
Employment, Mrs Pali-Petralia, declared in a number of public statements that 
‘Greece does not need more flexibility’. Our concern here is not with the 
position itself, but with its evidence-base. How did the minister know how 
much flexibility is there in Greece and how much more (or less) is needed? 
A year earlier, the Ministry of Finance – interestingly, without consultation 
with the Ministry for Employment – commissioned an independent study at the 
London School of Economics (LSE) to examine the extent of labour market 
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flexibility in the country and the main institutional rigidities found there. In 
March 2009, the final report of the LSE study – which, incidentally, is 
providing at least some evidence in support of the ‘flexibility thesis’ – was still 
being drafted and had not reached the hands of the Minister of Finance, let 
alone the Minister for Employment. Two years before the commissioning of 
the LSE study, the Employment Observatory (EO) of the Greek Manpower 
Organisation (ΟΑΕ∆) – which, despite its legal status as an S.A., is under 
direct government control8 – published a study on the extent and types of 
labour market flexibility in Greece (Gavroglou, 2006). The EO study reviewed 
a significant volume of statistical evidence concluding that Greece has 
sufficient amounts of some types of flexibility (mainly temping), but lags 
behind significantly in terms of other types, both numerical (e.g., part-timing) 
and, more importantly, functional (job demarcations, occupational mobility, 
sub-contracting, etc).9 Still, the report was not without shortcomings. One 
crucial factor was that it paid relatively little attention to the extent of 
unregistered employment in Greece, which introduces a large window of what 
is known in the international literature as ‘flexibility at the margin’ (Boeri, 
2005). The presence of such flexibility, of the most insecure type, tends to 
negate the adverse effects of almost any type of institutional rigidity (at the 
expense of equity, of course) – thus making the Minister’s assertion, that the 
country does not need more flexibility at least half-true (but, by implication, 
                                                 
8
 For example, its Director is directly appointed by the government.  
9
 A similar conclusion has been reached by one of the worlds’ leading experts on labour market 
institutions, Prof. Stephen Nickell; see Monastiriotis, 2005. This stands in some distance from 
evaluations of the Greek labour market by international organisations that characterise Greece as a rigid 
labour market with many institutional bottlenecks and inefficiencies (see for instance OECD, 2007 – 
for a critical view on this see Seferiades, 2003). 
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still erroneous): the country does not need more flexibility; but it does need a 
different type of flexibility, with many injections of security in the lower tier of 
unprotected employment and with a selective deregulation (e.g. on tenure and 
promotions) and re-regulation (e.g. on temporary employment) of the 
employment relationship in the public sector.  
Its shortcomings notwithstanding, to our knowledge, the EO study, as well as 
various less extensive studies on the issue of flexibility conducted by the 
Institute for Employment (INE) of the Greek General Confederation of 
Workers (e.g., as they appear on its Annual Reports), never made it to 
informing policy officials about the institutional conditions in the Greek labour 
market. As evidence for this, just one year after the publication of the EO 
study, in response to the call made by the Commission’s Green Paper on 
Modernising Labour Law (COM, 2006), the Greek government set up an 
Experts Committee, led by Professor of Employment Law and former PASOK 
MEP, Prof Ioannis Koukiadis, to put forward proposals for the reform of the 
Greek labour market. The report had an overly legalistic focus and made no 
reference to the labour market studies produced by the INE or the EO, while 
none of the authors of these studies participated in the Committee. The report 
found that many aspects of the Greek labour market exhibit extreme levels of 
flexibility but that other aspects are characterised by extreme rigidities. The 
main message of the report was that a selective re-regulation of the labour 
market was needed, to tackle the pervasive unregistered employment and to 
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introduce modern forms of flexicurity, so as to increase both its fairness and its 
efficiency.  
Right or wrong, the report was leaked to the press before its official publication 
and it was discredited both by the media (which, curiously, picked up only on 
the pro-deregulation proposals) and, importantly, by the Government. The 
latter refused to publish it (it is still only available unofficially10), while 
government officials made a series of demeaning statements on the Committee 
and its proposals and, according to reports in the press (Kathimerini, 1/4/08), 
Mrs Pali-Petralia admitted that she had not studied the report even almost a 
month after its was submitted to the Ministry for Employment. 
The disqualification of the ‘Koukiadis Report’ is also indicative of another 
aspect of Greek reform technology. In its short history of commissioning 
Expert Committees to advise on specific policies, Greece has an unflattering 
record of disregarding their advice. Just a few months before the inglorious 
conclusion of the Koukiadis Report, the Government had discredited another 
Expert Committee, which was set up to advise on the reform of the pension and 
social security system, chaired by Mr Nikos Analytis, former vice-president of 
the Federation of Greek Industries and president of the Greek Committee for 
Corporate Social Responsibility. When the Committee published its report in 
November 2007, Prof. George Alogoskoufis, then Minister of Finance, 
responded by saying: ‘we are not bound by the Analytis proposals’ (“δεν µας 
                                                 
10
 See, for example, http://media2.feed.gr/pegasus/Multimedia/pdf/koukiades_id454441.pdf.  
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δεσµεύουν οι προτάσεις Αναλυτή”).11 A pension reform was finally 
implemented that left everyone dissatisfied, including the government, which 
stated that this was only a partial reform, Mr Analytis, who in a speech on the 
reform package he characterised it as ‘timorous and ineffective’12 and Mr 
Giorgos Romanias, then Scientific Advisor of INE/GSEE, a person who is 
commonly perceived in Greece as ‘Mr Pension System’ (who incidentally was 
not a member of the Expert Committee). A few months after its approval in the 
Greek Parliament, the European Commission indicted the legislation forcing an 
ECJ ruling that ‘[gender] differences … as regards pensionable age and 
minimum length of service … are incompatible with Community Law’ (ECJ 
Judgement C-559/07).  
The most famous case of disregarding expert advice is perhaps that of the 
‘Spraos Committee’, which was set up in 1997 by the C. Simitis government to 
advise on the reform of the pension system. The Committee came up with what 
seemed at the time to be a set of highly unpopular proposals and was swiftly 
stashed away – even though many of its proposals are still considered today as 
essential for the long-run sustainability of the system. A new Committee was 
set up on the issue four years later under the same Prime Minister. The 
‘Giannitsis Committee’ had a weaker mandate and relied on expert advise from 
abroad (the British consultancy ‘Government Actuary’s’). Its proposals failed 
                                                 
11
 The signs for the non-adoption of the Committee’s proposals were evident even a year earlier, while 
the Committee was still working on its proposals: responding to reports in the media that the 
Committee will propose a significant rise in pensionable age, the then Minister for Employment, Mr 
Savvas Tsitouridis, declared that ‘there will be no change, in relation to the existing legislation, on … 
pensionable age, national insurance contributions, or pensions’– what was later coined by the Prime 
Minister as ‘the three Non’. 
12
 Speech at the 4th Hellenic Observatory Athens Conference, 25/6/08, Athens.  
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to address key weaknesses of the Greek system (tax / contributions evasion, 
low female employment participation, etc) and were soon rejected under the 
pressure of trade unions. The end result was a mini-reform package under the 
then Minister for Employment Mr Dimitris Reppas. Similar was the fate of the 
2002 ‘Georgakopoulos Committee’ (on the reform of the tax system) and 
earlier of the ‘Aggelopoulos Committee’ (also known as the ‘Committee of the 
Seven Wise Men’), that was set up to advise on wholesale economic reform but 
saw its proposals rejected by the weak (‘all-party’) coalition government of 
Zenophone Zolotas.  
The ill fate of such Expert Committees has often been explained in the 
literature by means of political contestation, veto points, vested interests and 
‘political costs’ (e.g., Featherstone, 2008). There are, however, two issues that 
such explanations do not account for: on the one hand, many of the proposals 
of these committees have been rejected before any systematic opposition had 
time to be expressed – and surely before any process of analytical reasoning let 
alone public dialogue; on the other hand, in many instances, the Committees 
themselves did not have the mandate, scientific composition, or necessary 
evidence base to come up with meaningful proposals. For example, only one 
member of the Koukiadis Committee was a labour economist; the Giannitsis 
Committee relied on an evaluation of the system that was alien to the Greek 
realities and drew very little information from hard data. 
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That is not to say that hard data, albeit sparse, do not exist in Greece; or that the 
capacity to produce hard data is somehow absent. Relative to its size, the 
country has a large set of think-tanks and policy or research institutes. Only in 
the broader field of socio-economic issues, one can list government-sponsored 
organisations such as the Centre for Economic Studies (ΚΕΠΕ), the National 
Centre for Social Research (ΕΚΚΕ), the Manpower Organisation’s 
Employment Observatory (ΠΑΕΠ-ΟΑΕ∆), the Institute for Migration Policy 
(ΙΜΕΠΟ), the National Documentation Centre (ΕΚΤ), and others; non-
governmental organisations such as the Institute for Economic and Industrial 
Research (ΙΟΒΕ, affiliated to the Federation of Greek Industries), the Institute 
for Employment (affiliated to the Greek General Confederation of Workers), 
the Macedonian Institute for Employment (ΜΑΚΙΝΑ), the Centre for Export 
Studies and Research (ΚΕΕΜ, affiliated to the Greek Exporters Association) 
and the very active research departments of the Federation of Industries of 
Northern Greece (ΣΒΒΕ) and of the Bank of Greece; university-based research 
institutes such as the Institute for Regional Development and the Institute of 
Urban Environment & Manpower at Panteion University, the Athens 
Laboratory of Economic Policy Studies at the Athens University of Economics 
and Business, and others; and independent institutions such as the Lambrakis 
Foundation, the Latsis Foundation, and many more. Most of these, however, 
remain underutilised, under-funded, and poorly connected to the policy-making 
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process. Let us use two examples from the Centre for Planning and Economic 
Research (ΚΕPΕ)13. 
First, in 2004 ΚΕPΕ published an extensive Study on the competitiveness and 
comparative advantages of the Greek economy. The study provides a unique 
insight into Greece’s chronic problem of international competitiveness, which 
is responsible for the country’s extremely high Current Account deficits. 
Amongst its other findings, the study emphasised the need to raise the 
technology content of industrial production and to support innovation and 
product differentiation in particular sectors which appear to have an unutilised 
potential for the country. What was the policy impact of this study? The most 
relevant public policy document, the National Strategic Reference Framework 
2007-2013, makes no reference to it. While it looks extensively at the issue, it 
provides its own analysis of competitiveness and comparative advantages 
without the sectoral and historical detail of the ΚΕΠΕ study. As a consequence, 
it reaches generic conclusions and thus the policy actions that it proposes are 
horizontal, encompassing all economic sectors and activities. Naturally, the 
proposed actions on ‘Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship’ are relegated to 
fifth place (in terms of funds committed) out of the eight sectoral Operational 
Programmes envisaged in the Reference Framework. 
 Second, in the last few years one of the Centre’s Senior Researchers published 
a series of papers examining the functional and administrative territorial 
                                                 
13
 The Centre was set up in the late 1950s with the explicit aim of advising the government on 
economic policy. 
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organisation of the country and providing important policy prescriptions about 
the administrative organisation of space (e.g. Prodromides, 2006, 2008a and 
2008b). Such studies have been produced in the UK since at least the late 1980s 
– for Greece however this was to our knowledge a unique piece of research. 
Notwithstanding, this research has not been taken into account in the recent 
discussions about the administrative re-organisation (Καποδίστριας ΙΙ), which 
was awkwardly considered a predominantly non-technical issue (Ladi, 2005). 
In fact, the debate about administrative re-organisation is conducted between 
the relevant Ministries and the organisations representing the local and regional 
authorities (ΤΕ∆ΚΝΑ, ΚΕ∆ΚΕ, ΕΝΑΕ) in the complete absence of relevant 
scientific and professional associations (such as the Greek section of the 
Regional Science Association International, the Greek Geographical Society, 
the Technical Chamber of Greece, or the Hellenic Association of Rural and 
Surveying Engineers) and with little reference to the European Spatial 
Development Strategy. This, despite the recommendation of the Institute for 
Local Administration (affiliated to KE∆KE) that the new zoning system should 
be on the basis of concrete spatial-planning criteria (ITA, 2008). 
But the lack of careful, evidence-based policy design – and thus of the 
necessary engagement with relevant expertise and knowledge – is also 
evidence at much smaller scales of policy-making. Ballas and Tsoukas (2004) 
offer a final example. Late in the 1990s the government in power decided to 
build two new hospitals, one in Corfu and one in Katerini. In both cases, the 
public debate focused on how the construction consortia were selected – no one 
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questioned the rationality of the decision to build new hospitals. Yet, in the 
case of Katerini one hospital already existed in the town and within 100km 
there were two more hospitals standing idle due to lack of funding. 
The above examples – and numerous others that can be considered – are just an 
indication of how poorly thought, ill-substantiated, and badly prepared public 
reforms in Greece may be. The problem in the above examples is not about the 
nature of evidence or whether there have been bottom-up learning mechanisms 
in place; but rather that there seems to have been no serious prior research, 
evidence gathering, consultation or planning. Or, even if there has been 
research done or past research available or consultation mechanisms in place, 
these seem to have been completely sidestepped without any justification or 
counter-evidence given by the political leadership at the helm of the reforms. 
To conclude, there is ample evidence that Greece’s policy-making technology, 
from the design of simple policies to wholesale reforms, suffers from an almost 
complete lack of engagement with scientific expertise and the relevant 
knowledge-base. Admittedly, the evidence base and knowledge production in 
the country is particularly thin, despite the relatively large number of think-
tanks and policy/research institutes. But even when the evidence base is there, 
or when the capacity to produce it is present, in most cases this expertise is not 
sought for or, in instances where it is, it is often discarded even before it 
reaches the level of political contestation and without the need for any counter 
substantiation or justification. Thus, whereas the thinness of hard data may be 
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taken to suggest that the deficient engagement is predominantly a supply-side 
problem, the underutilisation of the evidence that is available suggests that this 
is at least as much a demand-side problem, i.e., a problem of the policy-making 
institutions not seeking or not considering or engaging with the existing or 
needed evidence and knowledge base.  
A number of factors may be responsible for this – indeed, in the next section 
we consider some potential candidates. Whatever the causes, however, it 
appears that this deficient engagement is a fundamental problem in Greece’s 
reform technology that really goes beyond (in fact, precedes) the problems of 
political contestation and lack of consensus-building that have attracted most of 
the attention in the relevant literature. The claim here is that ill-informed 
policies produce sub-optimal results. They are thus inherently incapable of 
creating positive-sum exchanges (because the payoffs and costs to different 
players are unknown, as the evidence-base is lacking to inform policy-makers 
on these) and it is for this reason that policies/reforms are contested in the 
‘battle to institutionalise’ stage (political contestation, veto-players, etc). In this 
view, Greece’s specific reform technology leads deterministically to the 
rejection of at least a large number of new policies: contestation is bound to 
happen even if there are no ‘vested’ (but simply ‘simple’) interests and even 
with the best of intentions for consensus. 
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5. Concluding remarks: what explains the deficient engagement? 
Our discussion has shown that the role of experts and the degree of knowledge 
production, generation or utilisation in the Greek public policy process is 
particularly limited – and that, moreover, it fails in a series of levels within the 
policy formulation process. Yet, relative to the size of the country and its 
scientific community, it can be claimed that there is a reasonable number of 
think-tanks and public or non-governmental policy institutions. Although the 
evidence base itself may be weak, the institutions that could take on the role of 
producing and contextualising this evidence base (the first two steps in 
Britain’s EBPM model) appear to be present. It could be argued that the non-
production and non-processing (contextualisation) of knowledge by these 
institutions is more the result of a deficient demand for policy advice (as expert 
advice is discredited, sidestepped or circumvented) which in turn produces the 
supply-side problem of weak evidence base (hard data and their 
contextualisation). If this is the case, then what are the causes of the deficient 
engagement between policy-making and experts communities that underlies the 
failing reform technology of Greece? 
Examining the role of experts in reforms in Greece, Ladi (2005) observed an 
‘organic relationship’ between political parties and experts. In the case of the 
2001 constitutional reform, she found that it was common among experts who 
participated in the reform process to have a clear political affiliation with 
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particular parties or even to be leading party members (for instance PASOK’s 
MP Evangelos Venizelos and ND’s Minister of the Interior Prokopis 
Pavlopoulos who are both renown professors of constitutional and 
administrative law). Furthermore, she found that experts with tight links to 
political parties had more opportunities to participate in reform processes, and 
that it is only a relatively small elite of experts that participate in reform 
debates. Along similar lines, focusing on pension reform, Featherstone (2005: 
739) notes: ‘No effective community of policy expertise has been established in 
Greece: no group, network or institution independent of party or government 
has identified itself in this manner or developed a political voice...This is 
symptomatic of the rarity of effective, independent policy think-tanks in 
Greece’ (on the case of labour market reform see also Papadimitriou, 2005). 
The problem of expertise and knowledge utilisation extends to the core of 
public administration itself. Both Spanou (1996; 2003) and Sotiropoulos (2001; 
2004) have perceptively discussed the issue of politicisation of Greek civil 
service, especially of the higher echelons, and its negative implications in terms 
of planning, continuity, efficiency and effectiveness (see also Ballas and 
Tsoukas, 2004). Discussing different reform trajectories within the ‘Napoleonic 
model’, Spanou (2008) notes in this regard: ‘even though ministerial cabinets 
have not even remotely the structure, expertise nor the policy capacity of the 
French cabinets ministériels, they tend to play an important role at a policy 
level, since they are mostly staffed by persons that enjoy the minister’s political 
and personal trust’.  The negative impact of this structure on knowledge 
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production, contextualisation and utilisation is further enhanced by institutional 
competition, among government departments. As we discussed earlier on the 
issue of labour market flexibility, reports have been commissioned and expert 
advice sought separately by the two relevant Ministries (Finance and 
Employment) and with little, if any, coordination between them. It is thus no 
surprise that policy proposals by the different Ministries may appear divergent 
and that the resulting policies may seem inconsistent and thus be contested 
politically by the social partners. 
Finally, another factor that enhances the deficient engagement is the strong 
weight of political personality in any reform process. The relevant Ministers 
seem to place their opinions and preferences not simply in a central position   in 
the decision-making process but also above the experts at all levels of opinion-
formation, contextualisation and even of evidence-collection itself. Ministers 
often appear to know what the problems and facts are before the experts.  
It can thus be argued that the Greek reform technology resembles a closed 
party-dominated circuit that uses experts (who many times are already 
affiliated with political parties) either as personal advisors or as decision 
makers themselves. This use of experts attempts to legitimise reforms and the 
circuit itself. In essence, however, what it does is to destroy, or overshadow the 
need for dealing with the state’s ailing governing and reform capacity. The 
need for enhancing the state’s governing capacity via institutional research 
(both in-house and independent), learning, and knowledge production, 
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generation and utilisation is replaced by, and reduced to, the choice of one (or 
more) individuals to participate in the policy-making process. All this has 
rendered ‘research’ and ‘evidence’ foreign properties to Greek reform 
technology, and have generated a deep antipathy and mistrust to any form of 
‘technocracy’ in society.  
We believe that our discussion in this paper has helped identify a largely 
overlooked facet of Greece’s failing reform (and policy-making, more widely) 
technology. More often than not, reform proposals are drawn with little 
reference to a solid evidence-base and with very little attention to 
contextualisation. They are thus thrown into the field of political contestation 
without the level of maturity (i.e., the ability to identify and create positive-sum 
games) that will allow the constructive formation of stakeholder opinions – 
which should in turn allow the transformation of the technocratic input into a 
politically shaped outcome.  
We can sketchily place this process in the context of Peter Hall’s model of 
policy learning and change (Hall, 1993; Oliver and Pemberton, 2004). The lack 
of evidence-base and engagement with expert knowledge leads to a limited 
realisation of the problems of the system (learning failures in the ‘accumulation 
of anomalies’) thus producing experimentations with ‘instruments’ and 
‘settings’ (first and second order changes, in Peter Hall’s terminology) that are 
incapable of correcting the underlying anomalies. As a result, fine-tuning of the 
system fails and the latter becomes inherently unstable, calling continuously for 
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attempts for reform. This is not uncharacteristic of Greece, where one observes 
significant reform activism (or, at least, consensus on the idea that reforms are 
needed), albeit with little actual (and effective) reform. This failure to 
implement reforms despite the reform activism, we attribute to the fact that the 
deficient engagement with expertise is prevalent also at a later stage in the 
policy learning/change process, namely the stage of ‘fragmentation of 
authority’, where new ideas are sought for and utilised. In line with our 
discussion above, policy-makers do not search for new ideas for a combination 
of reasons: because the production of such ideas is not supported by the 
structure (the demand-induced supply deficiency, identified earlier), because 
the policy-makers place themselves above the relevant expertise and/or rely on 
party-affiliated individual experts, and because institutionally the relevant 
Ministries have low capacity to process/contextualise knowledge and low 
willingness to co-operate amongst themselves. In this sense, third-order 
learning, i.e., the adoption of new ideas, does not happen. What appears as a 
failing ‘battle to institutionalise the new policy framework’ (see Oliver and 
Pemberton, 2004) is in fact an ill-situated political bargain over instruments 
and settings that may (or may not) belong to a new policy paradigm but are in 
any case not applied to one.  
Under this reading, the continuous reform failures in Greece are not the 
responsibility of actors that exhibit ‘reform resistance’ and block reforms. 
Despite the resistance applied to them, the pension system, the education 
system and the labour market (among others) have been reformed in the recent 
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Greek history – perhaps a few times too many. Where the reform failure is 
located, is in the ability of the (proposed, contested, rejected or implemented) 
reforms to address the anomalies of the system that they seek to transform. 
Thus, the issue of political contestation and reform resistance becomes not one 
of power and veto points but one of efficiency and reform technology, where 
the resulting reforms are such that do not allow concerned actors to accept 
them; while the issue of successful reform implementation becomes a question 
of productive engagement with expert knowledge in all three levels: its 
production, contextualisation and political negotiation. We hope that this call 
for a shift of our attention to the specific pathologies that lead to such a 
production of inefficient reforms has the potential to make a significant 
contribution towards a paradigmatic shift in policy-making that can reform the 
reform technology of the country. 
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